Why do libyans want freedom
Furthermore, as General Haftar consolidated his control over eastern Libya during the year, both he and his chief of staff fired a number of elected municipal mayors and installed military figures in their place, including in Benghazi, Libya's second-largest city.
Additionally, the Constitutional Drafting Assembly CDA , which had been uncontested and maintained neutrality throughout the conflict, in became embroiled in political infighting.
The CDA released a second draft constitution in February after consultative sessions that took place in Oman, which included roughly half of its members. While an electoral law was published in the aftermath of the revolution and an electoral commission was appointed, in practice Libya lacks a functioning electoral framework. More than parties or lists spanning the political spectrum, from socialists to Islamists, organized to participate in the GNC elections, marking a clear departure from the Qadhafi era, during which political parties were illegal and all independent political activity was banned.
However, the legitimacy and integrity of the new parties steadily eroded, and all candidates in the elections were required to run as independents. Civilian politics and public participation were further marginalized by and subordinated to armed groups, as two opposing military coalitions in the east and west fought for control of the country and against extremist forces, including IS.
Throughout , political life in Libya was mired in obstructionist, zero-sum politics. The UN-backed PC, currently located off a naval base in Tripoli, had yet to secure control and reconcile rival political and military actors. None of the country's rival political and military camps constituted an effective national government in While the GNA enjoys strong backing from the international community, its domestic security is based on a fragile arrangement with various armed groups.
Even before the rift between the HoR and GNC opened in , the authority of elected officials was limited due to underdeveloped state institutions and the presence of autonomous regional armed groups, which by some counts number more than 1, Corruption has long been pervasive in both the private sector and the government.
The fall of the Qadhafi regime initially raised hopes that the level of graft would decline, but oil interests, foreign governments, smuggling syndicates, and armed groups still wield undue influence, especially in the south, and opportunities for corruption and criminal activity abound in the absence of effective fiscal, judicial, and commercial institutions.
The fall of the Qadhafi regime lifted restrictions on the long-repressed media sector. Citizen journalism became more common, and media outlets ranging from satellite television and radio stations to print publications multiplied in number. However, media freedom is increasingly limited by political and criminal violence that has made objective reporting dangerous. Many journalists and media outlets have censored themselves or ceased operations to avoid retribution by armed groups.
Threats and violent reprisals for reporting have prompted a growing number of journalists to flee the country. Post-Qadhafi authorities have sometimes sought to curb free expression through the approval of restrictive laws codifying insult crimes. The GNC has in the past directed a state internet service provider to turn over certain data, and to ban access to websites that hosted content dealing with Christianity or atheism, or which were deemed pornographic.
Nearly all Libyans are Sunni Muslims, but Christians form a small minority, with most hailing from neighboring countries. Some Salafi Muslim groups, whose beliefs reject the veneration of saints, have destroyed or vandalized Sufi Muslim shrines.
Egyptian Coptic Christian communities have been targeted by armed groups, including IS. Close state supervision of education ended along with Qadhafi's regime. However, laws guaranteeing academic freedom have not been passed, and by mid hundreds of schools across the country were closed due to a breakdown in the rule of law, or damage to facilities inflicted during fighting between various armed groups.
Although open and free private discussion improved dramatically after , the ongoing hostilities have taken their toll, with many Libyans increasingly withdrawing from political life or avoiding criticism of powerful actors, particularly in the eastern regions dominated by General Haftar's forces.
A law on freedom of assembly is generally compatible with international human rights principles. However, fighting and related disorder seriously deter peaceful assemblies in many areas. After General Haftar replaced the elected mayor of Benghazi with a military leader, the new authorities banned demonstrations without prior approval from the military.
A multitude of domestic nongovernmental organizations NGOs formed after the revolution. However, the number of active NGOs continued to decline in , due to armed conflict and the departure of international donors. The penal code prohibits all sexual acts outside marriage, including consensual same-sex relations, and punishes them with flogging and up to five years in prison. According to human rights activists, armed groups have continued to detain people because of their sexual orientation.
Libya remained a major hub for refugees, asylum seekers, and migrants on their way to Europe. As of August, the IOM reported that there were , migrants in Libya, including more than 60, children. Libya is not a party to the Refugee Convention and does not have a refugee law or procedure. UNHCR registers some asylum seekers but they—and those unable to register—are not effectively protected and assisted in Libya. To discourage and prevent arrivals in Europe from Libya, the European Union has provided training, equipment, and funds to Libyan coast guard forces to intercept boats both in Libyan coastal waters and international waters, and to return migrants and asylum seekers to Libyan territory.
Migrants and asylum seekers who are captured at sea and returned to Libyan territory, are placed in detention, where many suffer inhumane conditions, including beatings, sexual violence, extortion, forced labor, inadequate medical treatment, and insufficient food and water.
The United States did not report any civilian casualties. In a report issued on May 10, Cecilia Jimenez-Damary, the special rapporteur on the human rights of internally displaced persons IDPs and the first expert under the UN Special Procedures mechanisms to visit Libya after , criticized the lack of a legal framework for addressing the rights and needs of IDPs, and the absence of a comprehensive policy in line with international standards.
In June, the UN Security Council renewed the arms embargo on Libya, effective since , for another 12 months, and added measures to inspect vessels suspected of violating the embargo.
On June 7, the Libya Sanctions Committee responsible for overseeing sanctions imposed by the Security Council, approved the addition of six individuals—including two Eritrean and six Libyan nationals—to the Libya Sanctions List subjecting them to asset freezes and travel bans in relation to alleged serious human rights abuses of migrants and participation in illicit human trafficking and smuggling.
On September 5, the UN Panel of Experts, established pursuant to UN Security Council resolution , issued its final report on threats and attacks on Libyan state institutions, human rights abuses, violations of the arms embargo, illicit exports of petroleum and implementation of asset freezes and travel bans.
According to the panel, weapons transfers to eastern Libyan such as armored vehicles, rifles, mortar, and rocket launchers have increased most notably in eastern Libya, which indicated that member states were not sufficiently enforcing the arms embargo. In September, the UN Sanctions Committee imposed an asset freeze and travel ban on Ibrahim Jadhran, a Libyan militia commander, for his repeated attacks against the oil crescent region in Libya that resulted in civilian casualties and for his attempts to export oil illegally.
Human Rights Watch. World Report Donate Now. Libya Events of Armed forces allied to internationally recognized government fight with armed group in Tripoli, Libya September 22, Available In: Available In. Jonathan Winer, a former U. Some of these militias played critical roles in defeating the Islamic State militants in Libya.
In eastern Libya, there is now a systematic attempt to silence civil society activists and any form of dissent against the LNA. There is no single authority that, I would say, controls the environment or the landscape, which makes it very unpredictable for journalists to conduct their work.
In May , a Benghazi-based military court, led by the LNA, sentenced photojournalist Ismail Abuzreiba al-Zway to 15 years in prison for "communicating with a television channel that supports terrorism.
But the experience had a longer lasting impact. A decade after returning to Libya to be part of the new era, Fhelboom has left his country for good. It won't have any kind of social justice or democracy. Editor's Note. This article has been corrected to clarify that Fhelboom was taken by the al-Nawasi militia.
Search Search. This is especially important for creating momentum to encourage more Libyans to join the revolution. Understandably, these paid soldiers do not have a stake in the matter, as they stand to benefit only economically. Their role, consequently, is isolating the regime and increasing its chances of falling.
The Libyan Diaspora has a significant role to play in this uprising. Though undeniably important, it is not enough for Libyans to protest outside embassies overseas.
The fall of the Qaddafi regime will certainly create a political vacuum in a country that already lacks the infrastructure of a civil society. This vacuum could allow long-entrenched social groups to take a leadership role in the post-Qaddafi era. In particular, it is likely that tribal leaders will come to power, as they have already positioned themselves well by declaring support for the revolution.
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